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Visual Abstract
Social contexts substantially influence individual behavior, but little
is known about how they affect cognitive processes related to volun-
tary action. Previously, it has been shown that social context reduces
participants’ sense of agency over the outcomes of their actions and
outcome monitoring. In this fMRI study on human volunteers, we
investigated the neural mechanisms by which social context alters
sense of agency. Participants made costly actions to stop inflating a
balloon before it burst. On “social” trials, another player could act in
their stead, but we analyzed only trials in which the other player
remained passive. We hypothesized that mentalizing processes during
social trials would affect decision-making fluency and lead to a de-
creased sense of agency. In line with this hypothesis, we found in-
creased activity in the bilateral temporo-parietal junction (TPJ),
precuneus, and middle frontal gyrus during social trials compared with
nonsocial trials. Activity in the precuneuswas, in turn, negatively related
to sense of agency at a single-trial level. We further found a double
dissociation between TPJ and angular gyrus (AG): activity in the left AG
was not sensitive to social context but was negatively related to sense
of agency. In contrast, activity in the TPJ was modulated by social
context but was not sensitive to sense of agency.
Key words: Diffusion of responsibility; fMRI; mentalizing network;
sense of agency
Significance Statement
The presence of other people can have substantial influence on how individuals act. Understanding the
cognitive and neural processes underlying such behavioral changes would allow for better prediction of
social context effects on individual actions and, ultimately, support the development of optimized learning
environments and interventions aimed at improving social behavior. The work presented here on the neural
processes underlying social context effects on sense of agency is an important contribution to research on
human cognition, voluntary action, and social psychology.
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Introduction
Cognitive neuroscience research on voluntary action is
conducted mostly separately from studies of social be-
havior, yet a great proportion of human behavior takes
place in social contexts. A behavior that is not itself social
can nevertheless be influenced by the presence of other
agents. For example, diffusion of responsibility is a com-
mon phenomenon that describes the effects social con-
text can have on individual behavior: the presence of
others decreases the likelihood that someone will interfere
in an emergency or social transgression (Darley and La-
tane, 1968; Chekroun and Brauer, 2002), decreases the
effort invested in a work project (Karau and Williams,
1993), increases risk taking (Wallach et al., 1964; Bradley,
1995), and increases aggression (Bandura et al., 1975;
Meier and Hinsz, 2004).
However, although social psychology has long ac-
knowledged that social contexts greatly affect the way
people act (Asch, 1956; Milgram, 1963; Wagner et al.,
1986; Brewer et al., 1993; Bond and Smith, 1996; Blass,
1999; Leach and Spears, 2009), little is known about how
the presence of others affects the cognitive processes
underlying voluntary action.
Sense of agency—the feeling that we are in control of
our actions and their consequences—is closely linked to
feelings of responsibility (Moretto et al., 2011; Frith, 2014).
A previous study using event-related potentials investi-
gated how diffusion of responsibility influences outcome
processing and sense of agency (Beyer et al., 2017). This
study employed a task in which participants acted in
either a social or nonsocial context but had the same
control over action outcomes in both settings. In social
trials, participants reported lower sense of agency and
showed reduced outcome monitoring, reflected in a re-
duced feedback-related negativity (FRN).
In parallel, studies have shown that the difficulty of the
action selection process plays an important role in sense
of agency (Sidarus et al., 2013; Chambon et al., 2014;
Sidarus and Haggard, 2016; Sidarus et al., 2017): disrup-
tion of action selection by incongruent priming or incon-
gruent flanker stimuli reduces sense of agency. This effect
is related to activity in the left angular gyrus (AG), with
enhanced AG activity during action selection being cor-
related with a reduction in sense of agency in high-conflict
trials (Chambon et al., 2013). Similarly, increasing working
memory load has been found to reduce sense of agency
(Hon et al., 2013; Howard et al., 2016; Wen et al., 2016).
An appealing synthesis of these findings is that social
contexts reduce sense of agency and the monitoring of
action outcomes by making the action selection process
less fluent (Fig. 1). In a social context, mentalizing pro-
cesses may make it more difficult to decide if and when to
act, reducing participants’ sense of agency and their
monitoring of action outcomes (Beyer et al., 2017).
The present fMRI study investigated the influence of
social context on neural processes during the action se-
lection phase of a task and related these to the sense of
agency over action outcomes. We adapted the balloon-
analog risk-task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002), in which
participants had to stop an inflating balloon from bursting
by pressing a button. Although this button-press was
costly (resulting in the loss of monetary points), not acting
(letting the balloon burst) was more costly. In the social
context, another player was present (represented by an
avatar on the screen), who could act instead of the par-
ticipant, but, in the trials analyzed, did not.
We made the following predictions, according to the
above model of diffusion of responsibility. (1) During ac-
tion phases of social trials, we should find increased
activity in brain areas associated with mentalizing pro-
cesses [temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC), precuneus, temporal poles; Lieberman,
2007]. (2) There should be a negative relationship between
activity of mentalizing areas during the action phase and
sense of agency. (3) In social trials, participants should
show reduced outcome monitoring (i.e., reduced reactiv-
ity of prefrontal areas to outcome presentation)
If thinking about a coplayer’s intentions reduces sense
of agency, participants who are more prone toward
adopting someone else’s point of view could be more
strongly affected by social contexts. In an exploratory
analysis, we tested whether the reduction of sense of
agency in social contexts is related to personality factors
such as locus of control or the tendency to adopt other
people’s perspectives. For these analyses, we included
behavioral data and personality questionnaire scores of
participants who participated in the same experiment but
performed the task outside the fMRI scanner.
Materials and Methods
Procedure
Participants were invited into the lab in mixed-sex pairs
of two. Participants wishing to perform the task in the MRI
scanner and participants who were to perform the task
outside the scanner were recruited separately through
different study advertisements, and none of the partici-
pants attending the study together reported knowing
each other. Participants received instructions together
and gave informed written consent. They were instructed
that they would be playing together, with one participant
inside the MRI scanner. One participant was then shown
to a computer where they would be performing the task,
the other was brought into the MRI. In fact, both partici-
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pants were playing separately. After the task was finished
(and, for the MRI participants, after the acquisition of
structural images), participants filled out a postexperi-
mental questionnaire assessing their belief regarding the
other player’s participation in the game, as well as per-
sonality questionnaires (see below). Participants were
then fully debriefed, paid, and thanked for their participa-
tion. Participants received £10.00 per hour, plus any earn-
ings from the task.
All procedures were approved by the local ethics com-
mittee and were conducted according to the Declaration
of Helsinki.
Participants
Twenty-four participants (all right-handed) participated
in the MRI experiment. Data of one participant had to be
excluded because of movement of 4 mm during func-
tional scans. Data of two participants had to be excluded
because they failed to stop the balloon on the majority of
trials, resulting in trial numbers of 10 per experimental
condition. Finally, during data analysis, one further partic-
ipant had to be excluded because lack of variability in
their control rating in at least one task run, resulting in
failure of the parametric modulation model. Thus, data of
20 participants (7 male; age 18–27 years, mean 22 years)
were included in the MRI analyses.
For correlation analyses between diffusion of responsi-
bility scores and personality variables, we additionally
included data of 19 participants (9 male, mean 22 years
old) who performed the task without MRI. Of the 24
testing sessions, 1 non-MRI participant failed to attend
and had to be replaced by a confederate; for 4 partici-
pants, the experiment was terminated prematurely due to
technical failure, resulting in a total of 19 participants with
behavioral but not neural data.
Task
The task was modeled after the one used in Beyer et al.
(2017) and designed to mimic diffusion of responsibility
scenarios, in which the presence of another potential
agent may motivate a person to not take action. It pro-
vided immediate action feedback, such that outcome
predictability was identical across social and nonsocial
action contexts, as in the social context, there was no
ambiguity as to which player caused a given outcome.
The payoff structure of the task was designed to mimic
the cost–benefit structure of typical bystander scenarios
in which bystanders have to weigh the cost of, for exam-
ple, helping an injured person (e.g., loss of time) against
the cost of not helping (e.g., further injury to the victim). As
such, actions were designed to be costly, but less costly
than not acting.
Inside the MRI, participants used two button boxes with
four buttons each to control a balloon-inflation game.
They observed the computer screen through a mirror
fixed to the head coil. Participants outside the scanner
used eight neighboring buttons on a standard computer
keyboard. Fig. 2 shows an outline of the task time course
as well as the different conditions. During the task, each
participant was represented by their own individual avatar
(http://www.freepik.com). The task consisted of three
runs of 20 trials each (10 nonsocial trials and 10 social
trials, in randomized order). Before the first run, partici-
pants played a short practice block of two nonsocial trials
and two social trials. At the beginning of each trial, par-
ticipants saw either their avatar alone or their own avatar
next to the other player’s avatar. After 2 s, a small balloon
appeared in the center of the screen and started inflating
at variable speed, which increased unpredictably on each
trial. Above the balloon was an image of a pin. As soon
as the balloon touched the pin, it would burst and the
word ‘pop’ would appear on the screen. At any time,
the participant could press a button to stop the balloon.
In that case, the balloon stopped and a red rectangle
appeared around the participant’s avatar to indicate it
had been them who stopped the balloon. Due to the
unpredictable change in speed, it was risky to wait to
the last possible moment before stopping the balloon.
In social trials, if the other player acted before the
participant, the balloon would stop and the rectangle
Figure 1. Model of social context influences on sense of agency. The figure shows a previously proposed model (Beyer et al., 2017)
of social context influences on sense of agency. It proposes that mentalizing processes increase dysfluency in the action selection
phase, reducing sense of agency and outcome monitoring.
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would appear around the coplayer’s avatar. The dura-
tion of the action phase was fixed to 8 s, with a fixation
cross presented at the end if the balloon was stopped
or popped earlier.
After a variable interval of 2–4 s, the outcome was
presented. To ensure comparability to the previous study
using this design (Beyer et al., 2017), actions in this task
were costly. If they stopped the balloon, participants lost
1–30 points, depending on the size of the balloon: the
bigger the balloon was when stopped, the fewer points
they lost; however, the outcome was not entirely predict-
able from the balloon size. If the balloon burst, partici-
pants lost 80–99 points. In social trials, if the coplayer
stopped the balloon, participants lost 0 points. If the
balloon burst, participants were told that both players
would lose 80–99 points. The outcome was presented for
2 s, followed by a jittered interval of 2–4 s. After that,
participants saw on the screen the question, “How much
control did you feel over the outcome?” Below the ques-
tion, they saw the numbers 1–8 aligned as a scale with the
labels “No control” (left of the 1) and “Complete control”
(right of the 8). Participants were instructed that they
should rate the amount of control they felt they had had
over the number of points they had lost in the given trial.
If participants did not make a response within 4 s, the
message “Please make a control rating!” was displayed
for 2 s and the trial ended (mean number of missed ratings
per participant  0.33; maximum number of missed rat-
ings  2). Trials were separated by a jittered intertrial
interval of 4–8 s.
The coplayer’s behavior was programmed to ensure the
participant would act to stop the balloon on the majority of
social trials. The coplayer would only stop the balloon if
the participant had stopped the balloon on the majority of
social trials so far (50%, that is, for the coplayer to act,
the participant must have acted on at least one social trial
more than the coplayer), and for a maximum of three trials
per block. Thus participants performed individual actions
in a context of social uncertainty.
At the beginning of each block, participants received an
endowment of 1000 points, which corresponded to 1.00£,
from which that block’s losses were subtracted.
Figure 2. Task design. In nonsocial trials, participants saw their own avatar and an inflating balloon. Successful stopping of the
balloon by button press resulted in loss of monetary points depending on balloon size (A). If the balloon popped, a large number of
points was lost (B). In social trials, action–outcome contingencies were identical to those in nonsocial trials (C). If the coplayer acted
first, the participant lost no points (D). The task timing is shown in E.
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Personality questionnaires
To assess interpersonal variability in relevant personal-
ity traits, we used Rotter’s Locus of Control (LoC) scale
(Rotter, 1966) and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI;
Davis, 1980).
The LoC contains 29 forced-choice items in which sub-
jects have to choose one of two statements depending on
which they agree with better. It was designed to assess
subjects’ expectancies for control over reinforcement.
Higher scores on this scale represent a more external
locus of control, lower scores a more internal locus of
control.
The IRI consists of 28 items and 4 subscales: perspec-
tive taking, fantasy, empathic concern, and personal dis-
tress. Answers are given on a 5-point Likert scale with the
labels “Does not describe me well” (1) and “Describes me
very well” (5). We were particularly interested in the sub-
scale “perspective taking,” which contains items such as,
“I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the ‘other
guy’s’ point of view.”
Behavioral data
Our analyses focused on trials in which the participant,
not the coplayer, acted. Each trial was classified accord-
ing to experimental condition (social vs. nonsocial) and
trial outcome (number of points lost). The dependent
variable was the agency rating made at the end of the trial.
All trialwise data were entered into a mixed-effects
linear model in R (Bates et al., 2014; Team, 2014), with
participant as random effect. The advantages of this anal-
ysis approach over traditional analyses, such as ANOVA,
are its robustness against differences in trial numbers
between conditions, the simultaneous analysis of within-
subject and between-subject variability, and the possibil-
ity to analyze conditions with low trial numbers (Bagiella
et al., 2000; Baayen et al., 2008). The experimental factor
of social context (coded 0.5 for nonsocial, –0.5 for social)
and outcome magnitude (standardized within partici-
pants), as well as the interaction between the two, were
entered as predictors of agency ratings. These fixed ef-
fects were also allowed to vary between participants (i.e.,
random slopes model). In an additional analysis, we mod-
eled outcome magnitude by experimental condition and
reaction time (RT; standardized within participants).
Analyses were conducted using the lme4 package
(Bates et al., 2014) in R. Parameter estimates () and their
associated t tests (t, p), calculated using the Satterthwaite
approximation for degrees of freedom (Kuznetsova et al.,
2015), are presented to show the magnitude of the ef-
fects, with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (Efron
and Tibshirani, 1994).
For analysis of between-subject variability in sensitivity
to social context and personality variables, we calculated
for each participant the mean difference in agency ratings
between nonsocial and social trials. Again, for this analy-
sis, we considered only trials in which the participant
stopped the balloon. We then correlated this diffusion of
responsibility score with the locus of control score and the
score on the subscale “perspective taking” of the IRI.
Distribution of analyzed datasets and statistical tests
performed are given in the Table 1.
MRI recording and image preprocessing
MRI images were recorded using a 3.0-Tesla Siemens
trio scanner and a 32-channel head coil. T1-weighted
structural images were recorded with the following spec-
ifications: matrix, 240  256; 176 sagittal slices; voxel
size, 1  1  1mm. Three runs of functional images were
recorded with the following specifications: matrix, 64 
64; 48 transversal slices in ascending order; 180 volumes
per run; TR, 3.3 s; TE, 30 ms; voxel size, 3  3  3mm,
including a 0.3-mm slice gap.
Preprocessing was conducted using FSL 5.0 (Smith
et al., 2004; Jenkinson et al., 2012) to allow for indepen-
dent component analysis (ICA)-based correction of move-
ment artifacts. Motion correction was performed with
MCFLIRT, and images were brain extracted and spatially
smoothed with a 5-mm kernel. We then used the toolbox
AROMA (Pruim et al., 2015) to perform ICA-based correc-
tion for motion artifacts. This approach has been shown to
be superior to the standard approach of including motion
regressors in first-level analyses (Pruim et al., 2015).
Functional data were then normalized into MNI space
using the participant’s structural image for coregistration,
applying nonlinear registration with 12 degrees of free-
dom, and high-pass filtering with a cutoff of 100 s.
MRI statistical analysis
All further MRI analysis was conducted using SPM12
(Ashburner et al., 2014), to allow for the use of SPM-based
toolboxes. At the subject level, we defined task regres-
sors for the action phase for social and nonsocial trials.
These included only trials in which the participant stopped
the balloon, and regressors were modeled from trial onset
Table 1. Statistical analysis
Location Data structure Statistical test Confidence interval/achieved power
a Nonnormal distribution Mixed-effects linear model 0.12, 0.95
b Nonnormal distribution Mixed-effects linear model –0.73, –0.43
c Normal distribution t test 0.1, 0.55
d Normal distribution t test –0.01, 0.28
e Normal distribution t test –0.1, 0.4
f Normal distribution t test 0.1, 0.7
g Nonnormal distribution Mixed-effects linear model 0.18, 0.68
h Nonnormal distribution Mixed-effects linear model –0.10, –0.02
i Nonnormal distribution Mixed-effects linear model –0.16, –0.01
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for the duration of 10 s (2 s of condition information and 8
s of action phase). As parametric regressors for the action
phase, we included trialwise agency ratings. For these
trials, we also modeled the outcome presentation with a
duration of 2 s and included outcome magnitude as a
parametric regressor (with higher numbers indicating
worse outcomes). Regressors of no interest included
the agency rating phase, trials in which the balloon
popped, trials in which the coplayer stopped the bal-
loon, and button presses.
The contrast “action phase social”  “action phase
nonsocial” was defined at the subject level. For the para-
metric modulation, we weighted the linear effect of the
parametric modulator negatively for both conditions. At
the group level, we performed one-sample t tests for
these contrasts against zero. The same was done with the
contrast “outcome social”  “outcome nonsocial.” For
whole-brain MRI analyses, we used a significance thresh-
old of p  0.01 family-wise error (FWE) corrected at the
cluster level (initial uncorrected threshold p  0.001).
For the parametric analysis, we were specifically inter-
ested in whether regions more active during the action
phase in social trials would be negatively related to
agency ratings across task conditions. This was based on
our hypothesis that mentalizing during the action phase
should increase action selection dysfluency and thus re-
duce sense of agency. To obtain regions of interest (ROIs)
for testing the parametric modulation for the action phase,
we used the toolbox marsbar (Brett et al., 2002) to define
ROIs based on the significant clusters from the action
phase social  action phase nonsocial comparison. We
then tested these ROIs for negative modulation by control
ratings with a significance threshold of p  0.05. We also
include a more stringent p-value corrected for running the
tests across 4 ROIs. Because, in SPM, parametric regres-
sors are orthogonalized to the main regressor, this com-
parison is independent of the main contrast used to define
the ROIs. Moreover, we specifically investigated paramet-
ric modulations across task conditions; that is, we looked
for neural activity related to sense of agency indepen-
dently of social context. To test for interaction effects in
which the parametric modulation by agency ratings differs
across social context, we performed a paired t test di-
rectly comparing the parametric effect between experi-
mental conditions.
Results
Behavioral analyses
Our main behavioral analyses focused on the data from
the 20 subjects performing the task in combination with
fMRI scanning. Comparing task performance between
social and nonsocial contexts, we found that participants
lost overall fewer points in the social context [mean 26.2
(standard error 0.9)] compared with the nonsocial context
[40.3 (0.9); t19  10.2, p  0.001]. This reflected adaptive
behavior in the social context, as there were significantly
fewer popped balloon trials in the social context [6.0 (0.4)]
than the nonsocial context [10.2 (0.3); t19  8.0, p 
0.001] and in social context trials, the coplayer stopped
the balloon more often [7.3 (0.3)] than it popped [6.0 (0.4);
t19  3.5, p  0.01].
The mixed model analysis showed significant main ef-
fects of social context (  0.54; t19.5  2.55; p  0.05;
CI  [0.12, 0.95])a and outcome magnitude (  –0.58;
t18.5  7.58; p  0.001; CI  [–0.73, –0.43])
b, but no
interaction (p  0.54). As can be seen in Fig. 3, partici-
pants reported lower sense of agency for worse out-
comes, and lower sense of agency in the social context.
These results replicate the finding of Beyer et al. (2017),
showing that acting in a social context reduces subjective
sense of agency, independently of outcome magnitude.
The model for outcome magnitude in trials in which
participants stopped the balloon showed that outcomes
were related to reaction times (  0.24; t22.7  6.06; p 
0.001; CI [0.17, 0.32]), as is in the nature of this task, but
not to experimental condition (p  0.14) or their interac-
tion (p  0.16).
In an additional analysis of agency ratings, we included
the data from the 19 participants performing the task without
MRI. In this analysis, agency ratings were modeled by the
between-subject factor of group (with or without MRI) and
the within-subject factors social versus nonsocial context
and outcome magnitude. This analysis replicated the
above findings, with no significant effect for the group
factor or its interactions (Table 5).g
Mean and distribution values for the personality ques-
tionnaires are given in Table 2. None of the personality
variables were correlated with diffusion of responsibility
scores (defined as difference in mean agency ratings be-
tween experimental conditions; all p  0.4). Importantly,
Figure 3. Behavioral results. Participants (n  20) reported lower sense of agency for worse outcomes (higher number of points lost).
Independently of outcome magnitude, agency ratings were lower in social compared to nonsocial trials.
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mean diffusion of responsibility scores did not differ be-
tween participants performing the task inside [0.46 (0.21)]
and outside [0.26 (0.14); p  0.43] the MRI.
Neural reactivity to social context
For the action phase of social trials, compared with
nonsocial trials, we found increased activity in the bilateral
TPJ, the precuneus, and the right middle frontal gyrus
(MFG; Fig. 4A; Table 3). Both the TPJ and the precuneus
are typically found to be activated during tasks that in-
volve mentalizing (Lieberman, 2007; Schurz et al., 2014).
At a liberal threshold of p  0.001 uncorrected, we also
found a cluster in medial prefrontal cortex (x  4, y  46,
z  38).
The reverse contrast for the action phase, nonsocial 
social, showed significant clusters in the right postcentral
gyrus, the bilateral insula, the left middle frontal gyrus, the
right middle temporal gyrus, the right cingulate gyrus/
supplementary motor area (SMA), the left prefrontal/infe-
rior frontal gyrus, and the right middle occipital gyrus (Fig.
4B). None of these regions were parametrically related to
sense of agency (all p  0.09).
Neural correlates of sense of agency
Next, we tested whether the increased activity in men-
talizing areas observed in the social context was nega-
tively related to sense of agency. ROIs were defined for
the clusters of the social nonsocial contrast (precuneus,
MFG, and bilateral TPJ). The contrast values for the para-
metric modulation by agency ratings were averaged
across all voxels in each ROI. This analysis showed sig-
nificant negative modulation of activity by agency ratings
for the precuneus [t19 2.28; p 0.017 (0.068 corrected);
Fig. 4C].c The parametric modulation approached signif-
icance for the MFG [p 0.071 (0.262 corrected)]d but was
not significant for the bilateral TPJ [p  0.143 (0.463
corrected)].e That is, activity in the precuneus during the
action phase was negatively related to the agency rating
made at the end of each trial. To assess whether relation-
Table 2. Personality questionnaire scores
Value Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Interpersonal reactivity index
Perspective taking 18.7 3.5 10 26
Empathic concern 19.2 5.6 8 27
Fantasy 18.0 5.3 6 27
Personal distress 13.0 4.5 2 24
Locus of control 12.0 3.8 5 19
Figure 4. Imaging results for the action phase. A, Increased activity in social trials in precuneus, bilateral temporo-parietal junction,
and middle frontal gyrus. B, Increased activity during nonsocial trials was found in anterior cingulate cortex, bilateral insula, and
middle occipital cortex, among other regions. Activity in the precuneus (C; ROI circled in A) and the left angular gyrus (D) was
negatively related to sense of agency on a trialwise basis. n  20.
Figure 5. Imaging results for the outcome phase. During nonso-
cial trials, occipital and parietal cortex showed increased activity
(A). During social trials, activity was increased in the bilateral
temporo-parietal junction and the precuneus (B). n  20.
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ships between agency and activity varied across social
context, we compared the parametric modulation between
social and nonsocial conditions in a paired t test. This
showed no significant effect for the precuneus ROI (p 0.4).
Thus, trialwise activity in the precuneus showed two in-
dependent main effects: activity was higher in social (vs.
nonsocial) conditions, and higher for decreased sense of
agency.
To test whether precuneus activity mediated social con-
text effects on sense of agency, we performed a mediation
analysis as implemented in the Mediation Toolbox (http://
wagerlab.colorado.edu/tools) developed by Wager et al.
(2008). To get trialwise measures of precuneus activity,
we used the BASCO toolbox (Göttlich et al., 2015) to
create trialwise -series for the precuneus ROI. We tested
a multilevel mediation model with social context as pre-
dictor, precuneus activity as mediator, and agency ratings
as dependent variable. This showed significant effects of
social context on precuneus activity (p  0.001), precu-
neus activity on agency ratings (p  0.05), and social
context on agency ratings (p  0.05), but no mediation
effect (p  0.4).
As described in the Introduction, we hypothesized that
decreased agency in our task may be driven by action
dysfluency, an effect previously observed by Chambon
et al., (2013), who found the left angular gyrus to be
negatively related to sense of agency in incompatibly
primed trials of a forced-choice instrumental task. To test
whether activity in the left AG was similarly related to
sense of agency in our task, we defined a 5-mm spherical
ROI around the peak coordinates (x  –36; y  –69; z 
45) given in Chambon et al. (2013). This ROI did not
overlap with the left TPJ cluster observed in the main
social  nonsocial contrast. As predicted, we found a
significant negative effect for the left AG for the paramet-
ric modulation by agency ratings during the action phase
[t19  2.12; p  0.023 (0.090 corrected); Fig. 4D].
f Activity
in the AG was not modulated by experimental condition
during the action phase (p  0.21), and the interaction
between agency ratings and social versus nonsocial con-
text was not significant for the AG (p  0.36). This result
indicates the AG is modulated by agency irrespective of
social context.
To allow for better comparison between the results for
the different ROIs, we conducted an additional ROI anal-
ysis using 5-mm spherical ROIs centered around the
cluster peaks for the social  nonsocial comparison con-
trast. This showed essentially the same results, with a
significant effect for the precuneus [t19  2.33, p  0.015
(0.060 corrected)] and no effect for the MFG [p  0.056
(0.207 corrected)] or TPJ [p  0.17 (0.526 corrected)].
Although reaction times are sometimes considered a
confound in parametric analyses, in speeded reaction
time tasks, sense of agency and reaction times are not
necessarily correlated (Chambon et al., 2013). However,
in the current study, reaction times were related to out-
come magnitude as shown above, which was in turn
related to sense of agency. Thus, whereas in speeded
reaction time tasks monitoring of reaction times might be
used as a proxy for task difficulty, in our task, reaction
times were strategically adjusted as a function of the
balloon inflation rate and perceived risk. Thus, any link
between reaction times and sense of agency is more likely
to be indirect and mediated by the outcomes. However, to
Figure 6. Proposed updated model of social context influences
on sense of agency. Our conclusions about influences on sense
of agency based on the observed results. Sense of agency is
negatively related to neural activity in precuneus and angular
gyrus during the action process, likely reflecting action selection
dysfluency. Activity in the precuneus is strongly affected by the
presence of a coplayer, forming a potential link between social
context and loss of subjective agency.
Table 3. Contrast values for the action phase
Region Peak MNI coordinates (x, y, z) Cluster peak (t value) Cluster size (n voxels)
Social  nonsocial
Precuneus –2, –62, 40 7.82 1011
Middle frontal gyrus 30, 26, 40 7.72 358
Right TPJ 44, –54, 22 6.48 676
Left TPJ –44, –52, 34 4.96 268
Nonsocial  social
Insula 40, 0, 12 6.91 351
Postcentral gyrus 52, –24, 20 6.11 334
Cingulate gyrus 12, 10, 38 5.98 407
Middle temporal gyrus 52, –56, 2 5.97 473
Middle temporal gyrus –46, –62, –2 5.41 120
Precentral/inferior frontal gyrus –50, 2, 10 5.11 186
Middle occipital gyrus 30, –90, 8 4.93 143
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test whether the effects observed here might be entirely
dependent on reaction times, we set up mixed-effects
linear models, modeling trialwise activity of precuneus
and AG. For each ROI, we ran three models, using both
agency ratings and reaction times, using only agency
ratings, and using only reaction times as predictors. For
both ROIs, the main effect of agency ratings on neural
activity remained practically unchanged by inclusion or
exclusion of the reaction time factor in the model
(Table 5). Thus, we show that the parametric modulations
by agency ratings observed here are not driven by effects
of reaction times.
For the model of precuneus activity, we found a signif-
icant agency  RT interaction effect, with post hoc tests
showing that agency modulated precuneus activity in
trials with average and slow reactions, but not in those
with fast reactions (Table 5).
Neural activity during the outcome phase
The main contrast nonsocial  social showed bilateral
activity in occipital cortex reaching into temporal and
parietal cortices (Fig. 4E; Table 4). The reverse contrast
showed activity in mentalizing areas (TPJ, precuneus; Fig.
4F; Table 4). There were no significant effects of the
Table 4. Contrast values for the outcome presentation
Region
Peak MNI
coordinates (x, y, z)
Cluster
peak (t value)
Cluster
size (n voxels)
Nonsocial  social
Middle temporal gyrus 40, –58, 6 6.86 709
Middle occipital gyrus –40, –80, 0 6.54 536
Cuneus –20, –86, 28 5.61 346
Precuneus 26, –60, 34 5.55 240
Social  nonsocial
Middle temporal gyrus 60, –6, –14 6.25 106
Precuneus –4, –52, 38 6.16 548
Right TPJ 60, –58, 34 6.00 219
Left TPJ –52, –56, 34 4.59 153
Parametric modulation by outcome magnitude,
run 1 only, p  0.001 uncorrected
Putamen –22, 12, 2 5.3 53
Cingulate gyrus –8, –4, 42 4.4 25
Precentral gyrus –28, –30, 48 5.6 18
Precentral gyrus –24, –14, 68 5.8 43
Precentral gyrus –30, –24, 64 4.6 20
Table 5. Results for additional mixed linear model analyses
Factor  estimate CI t value df p value
Model of agency ratings including group factor (MRI/no MRI)
Social context 0.43 0.18/0.68 3.4 37.1 0.002
Outcome –0.64 –0.75/–0.52 –10.9 37.4 0.001
Group –0.42 –0.91/0.07 –1.7 36.9 0.101
Condition  outcome 0.07 –0.07/0.21 1.0 120.6 0.341
Condition  group 0.21 –0.29/0.70 0.8 37.1 0.418
Outcome  group 0.07 –0.16/0.30 0.6 37.4 0.575
Condition  outcome  group 0.10 –0.18/0.39 0.7 120.6 0.483
Models of precuneus activity by agency ratings and reaction times
Agency –0.06 –0.10/–0.02 –2.7 19.8 0.014
RT –0.04 –0.08/–0.00 –2.0 571.0 0.043
Agency  RT –0.04 –0.08/–0.01 –2.3 91.4 0.024
Agency effect when using only agency as regressor –0.06 –0.10/–0.02 –2.9 18.9 0.009
RT time effect when using only RT as regressor –0.05 –0.09/–0.01 –2.4 643.7 0.015
Model test of precuneus activity by agency ratings for fast,
average and slow RTs
RT group
–1 SD of mean RT –0.01 0.03 –0.50 19 0.627
0 SD of mean RT –0.05 0.02 –2.70 19 0.014
1 SD of mean RT –0.09 0.03 –3.52 19 0.003
Models of angular gyrus activity by agency ratings and reaction times
Agency –00.08 –0.16/–0.01 –2.2 37.0 0.035
RT –00.07 –0.14/–0.01 –2.3 704.1 0.024
Agency  RT –0.04 –0.10/0.02 –1.2 232.7 0.218
Agency effect when using only agency as regressor –0.09 –0.17/–0.02 –2.4 37.1 0.020
RT effect when using only RT as regressor –0.09 –0.15/–0.02 –2.6 407.5 0.009
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parametric modulation by outcome magnitude. The latter
finding is somewhat surprising given that striatal reactivity
would be expected to correlate with outcome magnitude.
However, with increasing task experience, participants
may have become fairly good at roughly predicting out-
come magnitude. To test this, we performed a parametric
analysis focusing on functional run 1 only, showing the
expected striatal reactivity to outcome magnitude during
early task stages: at a significance level of p  0.001
uncorrected, cluster size10 voxels, we found a negative
relationship between number of points lost and activity in
the left putamen, cingulate gyrus, and precentral gyrus
(Table 4).
Discussion
We examined the relationship between mentalizing pro-
cesses while participants acted in social and nonsocial
settings and their subjective sense of agency over action
outcomes. We replicated previous findings showing re-
duced sense of agency in the social context. Increased
precuneus activity during social trials, an effect typically
linked to mentalizing in previous studies, was related in
our study to a reduction in the sense of agency over
action outcomes. We also found a dissociation between
anterior TPJ, which was sensitive to social context but not
sense of agency, and posterior AG, which showed the
opposite effect.
Neural correlates of social context
We found increased activity in the bilateral TPJ, precu-
neus, and right MFG during the action phase of social
compared with nonsocial trials. Both the TPJ and the
precuneus are associated with mentalizing processes
(Lieberman, 2007; Schurz et al., 2014).
Among different mentalizing tasks, the precuneus is
most consistently found active in tasks that involve mental
imagery, such as visuo-spatial perspective taking, false
belief tasks, or trait judgments (Schurz et al., 2014). Our
task did not involve any obvious visuo-spatial perspective
taking. However, efficient performance might depend on
simulating the coplayer’s strategies and level of risk affin-
ity. Thus, simulating another’s possible actions, though
not their spatial perspective, was presumably an integral
part of the mentalizing evoked during social trials. The
precuneus has also been found to show increased activity
in agency-related motion tasks, when participants expe-
rience increasing mismatch between their movement and
visual feedback and attribute motion to another agent
(Farrer and Frith, 2002; Nahab et al., 2011). However, this
area has generally received less discussion than the an-
gular gyrus or TPJ in the context of agency experiments.
For example, previous studies could not clarify whether
precuneus activation was action-related or strictly social.
In previous experimental designs, precuneus activation
could reflect one’s own lack of agency or provide evi-
dence that another person is the agent. Our data give a
clear answer to this question: we clearly identify precu-
neus activation associated with reduced sense of agency.
A recent study using retrograde tracing in macaques
(Passarelli et al., 2017) suggests that the medial precu-
neus is involved in higher-level visuospatial cognition and
is connected to areas associated with abstract action
planning.
The general pattern of activity we found (strong activity
in medial precuneus and bilateral TPJ, but not mPFC) is
consistent with that described by Schurz et al. (2014) as
commonly observed in “rational action” tasks, in which
participants have to infer the goal of an agent’s action
from nonverbal stimulus material. However, it has to be
noted that at a more liberal threshold, we did observe
increased mPFC activity in social trials and thus do not
base strong conclusions on this null finding.
During the action phase of nonsocial trials, participants
showed increased activity in postcentral gyrus, SMA, oc-
cipital cortex, insula, and cingulate gyrus. Interestingly,
similar results were found by Kuo et al. (2009), who com-
pared deliberative and intuitive social tasks. They found
stronger activity in precuneus, inferior parietal areas, and
MFG for the deliberative task, which required circular
reasoning (each player’s optimal strategy depends on the
other’s behavior), and increased activity in insulae and
cingulate cortex for the intuitive, relatively low-effort task.
Our findings similarly suggest that in nonsocial trials, the
balloon task posed a straightforward, intuitive task that
evoked strong focus and task engagement. In social trials,
this focus was to a degree reduced in favor of mentalizing
processes that were necessary to adjust individual strat-
egies to the other’s behavior.
Social context and the neural basis of sense of
agency
Replicating findings by Chambon et al. (2013), we found
a negative relationship between activity in the left angular
gyrus (AG) and agency ratings. Chambon et al., manipulated
action fluency by using compatible and incompatible prim-
ing and found the AG–agency relationship specifically for
high-conflict trials.
Studies directly manipulating participants’ control over
(visual) stimuli have found correlates of agency in the
more anterior temporo-parietal junction, with higher ac-
tivity in this region associated with a loss of agency (Farrer
and Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003, 2008). The areas
reported in these studies are distinct from the more pos-
terior region of the AG described above, but overlap with
the TPJ areas we found for the social  nonsocial con-
trast. Yet, in our study, activity in the TPJ was not related
to agency ratings. Possibly, the TPJ areas observed in
authorship-related studies, and in our social  nonsocial
contrast, are related to the detection of another agent in
the environment, rather than to one’s own sense of agency.
In authorship-related tasks (Farrer and Frith, 2002; Farrer
et al., 2003, 2008), the sense of control over the target
stimulus and the likelihood that someone else is involved
in the task are strongly negatively correlated and thus
cannot be differentiated on a neural level. Our task al-
lowed for the identification of areas related to the pres-
ence of a coplayer, but not sense of agency, and vice
versa (Fig. 4). Thus, we suggest that anterior TPJ areas
monitor the environment for the presence of a coplayer,
whereas the posterior AG is related to reduced sense of
agency in the face of action selection dysfluency. Our
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results suggest that this relationship between AG activity
and reduced sense of agency is stable across different
sources of conflict, be it social context or incompatible
response activation (Chambon et al., 2013).
Importantly, although AG and TPJ showed such dissoci-
ating patterns of activity for mentalizing and for nonagency,
precuneus activity did not show this dissociation. That is,
precuneus activity was both increased in the social con-
text and negatively related to sense of agency. Further,
precuneus activity did not mediate the social context
effect on agency. This presumably reflects a consistent,
strong effect of social context on precuneus activity—
thus, social context is a reliable cause of increased precu-
neus activity which, independently of the source of activity
increases, is negatively related to sense of agency.
The modulation of precuneus activity by agency ratings
was specific for trials with average and high reaction
times, but was absent in very fast trials. This might indi-
cate that precuneus activity was related to sense of
agency only in trials in which participants had sufficient
time to contemplate their action. In line with the above
findings that increases in decision-making dysfluency re-
duce sense of agency over action outcomes (Sidarus
et al., 2013, 2017; Sidarus and Haggard, 2016), one
straightforward explanation for our current findings is that
social cognitive processes interfere with, or at least com-
pete with, task-related action selection and preparation.
The relationship between precuneus activity and sense of
agency in nonsocial trials may reflect self-referential pro-
cesses such as adjustments of risk affinity (Lou et al.,
2004; Ochsner et al., 2005). Reduced sense of agency
over action outcomes might then be the result of meta-
cognitive processes: participants might interpret dysflu-
ency in action-related processes as a signal that the
action itself, and its outcomes, are liable to external influ-
ences or otherwise error-prone. In conclusion, we pro-
pose that precuneus activity in this task is related to
assessing relevant hidden attributes of the agents in-
volved in a given context, a process that presumably
becomes increasingly complex as the number of other
persons involved in the context increases. Such hidden
attributes of other agents are relevant for predicting their
potential actions and therefore constitute an important
source of action-related conflict. This would explain the
link between precuneus activation and sense of agency.
Updated model of social context effects on sense of
agency
To summarize, we found that activity in the AG was
related to nonagency and does not have any distinct
social activation. In contrast, activity in the precuneus was
associated with both nonagency and the presence of
another possible agent. Based on these findings, we
sought to update our model of diffusion of responsibility
and, more generally, social context effects on sense of
agency (Fig. 6). We propose that sense of agency is
prospectively influenced by action-related processing,
such as the fluency of action selection and action prepa-
ration. Angular gyrus appears to be related to aspects of
fluency that are unaffected by social context, such as
subjective task difficulty or the availability of a predeter-
mined strategy.
The coplayer’s presence likely evokes a range of cog-
nitive processes: on the one hand, TPJ activity may reflect
the mere detection of another agent’s presence in the
task environment, which is not related to sense of agency.
On the other hand, we suggest that considering the other
player’s risk affinity, and thus likelihood to act, and sim-
ulating their optimal game strategies, is reflected in in-
creased precuneus activity. Strategic considerations,
whether they concern one’s own behavior or that of the
other player, compete with the task-related focus, reduc-
ing the subjective experience of fluency and ultimately
sense of agency. As such, the precuneus sits at an inter-
section of context-related and action-related cognitive
processes, thus linking social contexts to reduced sense
of agency. Thus, according to our model, the presence of
a coplayer may have similar effects on sense of agency as
increasing working memory load or engaging in dual tasks
(Hon et al., 2013; Howard et al., 2016; Wen et al., 2016).
It is important to distinguish the processes proposed
here from cooperative social settings, in which a sense of
joint action may occur and which, if the action is truly
collaborative, can result in increased sense of agency
(Dewey et al., 2014). Future research needs to show
whether mentalizing processes have differential effects on
sense of agency depending on the nature of the social
interaction.
MRI results for the outcome phase
Our findings for the outcome presentation phase sug-
gest increased visual attention to outcomes in nonsocial
trials, reflected in increased activity in occipital and pari-
etal cortex. This supports our previous finding that out-
come monitoring is reduced when the action was
performed in a social context (Beyer et al., 2017). How-
ever, we found no correlate of increased outcome moni-
toring in nonsocial trials in prefrontal areas. During social
trials, we found increased activity in bilateral TPJ areas
and precuneus, suggesting that participants engaged in
mentalizing during the outcome phase as well.
Surprisingly, we found no striatal activity in relation to
outcome magnitude on a trialwise basis across all task
runs. However, activity in the left putamen showed the ex-
pected effect—stronger activity for better outcomes—at an
uncorrected level for the first task run. This suggests that
improved outcome prediction with increasing task expe-
rience reduced participants’ neural responsiveness to
outcome variability.
Behavioral findings
Consistent with our previous study (Beyer et al., 2017),
participants reported lower sense of agency the more
points they lost, and, independently of outcome, lower
sense of agency in the social context. This supports our
original observation that participants do not strategically
blame their coplayer for particularly negative outcomes in
social trials (Beyer et al., 2017). Rather, the agency-
reducing effect of the other player’s presence is indepen-
dent of the number of points lost on a given trial. This
independence of different influences on sense of agency
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is consistent with the underlying mechanisms proposed
here: whereas the influence of outcome magnitude is by
necessity a retrospective effect, we propose that the so-
cial context affects sense of agency while the action is
being planned and executed, and thus prospectively in-
fluences the sense of agency. The highest sense of
agency would therefore be associated with individually
planned and executed actions that result in positive out-
comes.
We did not include reaction times in our model of social
context effects on sense of agency, as reaction times
were related to outcome magnitude, which was in turn
related to sense of agency. Moreover, reaction times also
likely depended on individual risk affinity and were directly
related to final size of the balloon in a given trial. As such,
reaction times showed the opposite relation to sense of
agency as might be predicted from the perspective of
action fluency, as slower responses were associated with
a higher sense of control over action outcomes.
We found no relationship between diffusion of respon-
sibility effects and personality traits of perspective taking
or locus of control on the between-subject level. This
suggests that reduced sense of agency in social contexts
is driven by transient increases in mentalizing processes,
rather than by stable personality traits. This suggests
important possibilities for counteracting negative effects
of social context on individual behavior, e.g., shifting par-
ticipants’ attention away from the social context toward
the immediate task demands should reduce diffusion of
responsibility. However, it has to be noted that our sample
was primarily drawn from high-functioning student popu-
lations. For populations with extreme scores on relevant
traits (e.g., samples with callous-unemotional traits or
social anxiety), relationships between empathy and diffu-
sion of responsibility may exist.
Limitations
It should be noted that our interpretation of our findings,
i.e., that greater activity in TPJ and precuneus in the social
action context may reflect increased mentalizing pro-
cesses, which in turn interfere with action planning, is
based on reverse inference and does not preclude alter-
native explanations. TPJ and precuneus are strongly as-
sociated with mentalizing processes; however, these
regions are also activated in other cognitive tasks and,
importantly, are part of the default mode network. Further,
although our findings support our initial hypotheses, the
proposed relationship between mentalizing processes
and action planning remains to be clarified in future stud-
ies. Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that the
relationship between social context, precuneus activity,
and sense of agency is driven by processes other than
decision-making dysfluency. However, as our findings are
consistent with a large body of literature on theory of mind
and task difficulty in action selection, we are confident
that our interpretation is the most straightforward for the
current findings.
Further, while we matched visual input between exper-
imental conditions as well as possible, we cannot exclude
the possibility that some differences on the neural level
may have been related to the presence of the second
avatar in social trials. However, as differences between
conditions were not focused on visual areas, we do not
assume a strong influence of such effects on our results.
Conclusions
In this fMRI study, when participants acted in a social
context, neural activity patterns indicated increased men-
talizing. This included increased activity in the precuneus,
which was related to reduced sense of agency over action
outcomes, independently of social context. Our findings
are in line with our theory that in social settings, mental-
izing processes interfere with task-related processes,
which are necessary for the experience of strong agency
over action outcomes. We suggest that processing of
action selection and execution is complicated by social
cognition, reducing decision-making fluency. For exam-
ple, in social settings, one needs to consider other agents’
motivation and relevant personality traits, as well as the
impact one’s own actions will have on the other’s future
behavior. Our findings further suggest distinctive roles for
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and angular gyrus (AG) in
the differentiation between self and others: although TPJ
tends to be sensitive to the presence of a coplayer in the
task environment, AG is sensitive to sense of agency.
Finally, our findings support the proposal that the sense of
agency involves the continuous integration of information,
from multiple sources, that may become available at var-
ious stages of voluntary action—from intention to action
to outcome.
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